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Abstract
 Purpose: the purpose of this paper is to explore how rms organize to engage
in non-market strategy.
 Design: to achieve this end, we explore the organization of non-market strategy
via a formal model of the rm. The model is motivated by a qualitative study
of the organization of non-market strategy of 25 large, US rms.
 Findings: rms either integrate non-market strategy activities throughout the
rm or create stand-alone business units that specialize in non-market strategy
activities. We nd that the advantage of integration over specialization is U-
shaped in the importance of non-market strategy to the rms market strategy.
We identify several other factors that predict the advantage (and disadvantage)
of integration over specialization.
 Value: the value of this paper is that it is (to the best of our knowledge)
the rst to identify the factors that should cause a rm to either integrate
or specialize the organization of its non-market strategy. It also develops an
original typology of the organization of non-market strategy.
 Keywords: non-market strategy, corporate social responsibility, organizational
design
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Introduction
One of the most important points to be made up front is that there is
no single universally accepted method for designing a CSR structure
Business for Social Responsibility (2002)
How a rm organizes is a fundamentally important question. There has been a
plethora of work exploring how to organize a rm in terms of what belongs in and
outside of a particular rm. Early work includes Coase (1937), Williamson (1975),
and Grossman and Hart (1986). More recently, the growing eld of organizational
economics has focused on organizing within a rm. Primary areas of exploration have
included corporate hierarchy (e.g., Garicano (2000), Harris and Raviv (2002), and
Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008)), task design (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991), Laux (2001), and Schottner (2008)), delegation (e.g., Alonso and Matouschek
(2008), Prendergast (1995), and Krishna and Morgan (2008)), and incentive design
(see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a survey). This paper continues in this stream
of literature by exploring how to organize non-market activities within a rm. As
will be discussed, there is clear heterogeneity in how rms currently organize non-
market operations. The purpose of this paper is to propose a typology not only
to help identify di¤erent types of non-market organizational structures, but also to
understand why di¤erent organizational structures arise.
Non-market strategy is a broad term that refers to a rms activities outside of
the marketplace that can help it gain competitive advantage (Baron (2009)). This
includes both public politics strategies (e.g., lobbying and engaging with regulators)
and private politics strategies (e.g., engaging with activists). Meanwhile, corporate
social responsibility (CSR) can be a part of both of these types of political strate-
gies. CSR can be used to increase returns to lobbying and prevent or soften future
regulation (e.g., Lyon (2004), Baron (2009), Minor and Morgan (2011), Hong and
Minor (2014)). CSR can also be used to appease activists and possibly avoid future
adverse activist actions (e.g., see Godfrey (2005), Barnett (2007), and Baron (2009)).
Typically, rms do not have a division called "non-market" strategy. Instead, rms
have divisions that carry out some of these non-market strategy functions, but these
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groups are often referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainability, or
some similar name. Consequently, for this paper, we will focus on CSR divisions to
help illuminate how rms organize their non-market strategy functions though we
do consider the organizational consequences of adding non-CSR elements to a CSR
group in Section (). For the balance of the paper, we refer to non-market strategy
organization as organizing CSR strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
rst paper to explicitly explore the organization of these groups.
We begin in the next section by developing a typology of four types of CSR
strategy organization. We then use four rms to illustrate these categorizations.
This qualitative analysis motivates our next section, where we utilize organizational
economics to explore when a rm should choose a particular CSR strategy orga-
nizational form. In particular, we develop a model where a rm must decide on
organizing market strategy activities and non-market strategy activities in separate
units versus having both units engage in both activities. There is a trade-o¤ in
this decision in that there is an opportunity cost for a single unit to engage in both
activities; however, when both units engage in both activities, the rm receives out-
puts on both domains from two units as opposed to a single output towards each
domain from a single, specialized unit. In this sense, the model is related to the ex-
tant multi-tasking literature (see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Laux (2001), and
Prendergast (2002)). However, there are some additional elements that distinguish
it from this literature. First, it is assumed that there are some complementarities
between market and non-market strategy activities. That is, engaging in one activ-
ity can help the performance of the other. Second, and more novel, is that there
are externalities in our model, since we are dealing with (possible) social output.
In particular, both the manager and the rm may value CSR beyond its ability to
enhance nancial performance. This introduces the possibility of di¤erent outcomes
organizationally than if such externalities were not present.
We nd that the organization of the rm is generally non-monotonic in the im-
portance of CSR to the rm where importance comes from the degree of nancial
and social performance complementarities, the rms value of CSR, and the man-
agers value of CSR. In particular, for low and high values of CSR importance, it
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is best for the rm to integrate its CSR strategy business units should be engaged
in both market and non-market activities. However, for intermediate values of CSR
importance, it is best for the rm to organize CSR strategy activity into a stand-
alone business unit that specializes in CSR activities. The intuition is as follows. For
high-importance CSR settings, the synergy of CSR and nancial performance over-
comes the (potentially high) cost of multi-tasking within a business unit. In contrast,
for low-value CSR rms, the return to having two units both work on market strat-
egy activities overcomes the multi-tasking cost, which is small since business units
minimally engage in CSR when it is not very important. However, for intermediate
values of CSR, these forces net out in the opposite direction: CSR strategy activities
are su¢ ciently valuable to warrant a signicant level of activity, but not valuable
enough to overcome the (increased) cost of distracting a unit from market strategy
activities. Hence, having CSR strategy activities located in a specialized CSR unit
is the best organizational design for this setting.
Related to our study is the organizational design literature using agent-based
simulation. Owing to the di¢ culty of nding closed-form solutions in the analysis
of organizational design while using multiple variables, some have used agent-based
simulation to generate large-sample-size numerical examples to provide evidence of
optimal organizational design. For a recent example of this technique, see Claussen,
Kretschmer, and Stieglitz (2014). They study the trade-o¤ of commitment and
exibility within an organization. Similarly Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) explore the
trade-o¤ of organizational search and stability. Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005) extends
Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) to allow for dynamic environments. Given a particular
distributions of decisions across managers or departments, these papers focus on how
the primitives of the model predict which organizational form converges to a superior
(i.e., locally optimal) performance level. In contrast, this current paper focuses on
how to get the distribution of choices right when a particular manager might also
be making choices on the same dimensions as another manager or business unit.
In addition, these agent-based simulations generally assume mean zero performance
complementarities between di¤erent decision dimensions, as payo¤s are randomly
assigned assuming iid. That is, they do not explicitly consider the case where,
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for example, a non-market strategy can have a systematic bias to enhance market
strategy. Finally, all choices in these models are binary, which disallows the analysis
of magnitudes of choices and their relationship to organizational form. Thus, this
paper complements this strand of literature by exploring aspects of organizational
design that are not the focus of the extant papers. This paper also complements these
organizational design papers by explicitly analyzing rm-level non-market strategy
choice and implementation. Baron (2015) argues that more attention should be given
to this level of non-market strategy analysis.
We now begin with our typology.
A Typology of Non-Market Organization
Based on personal discussions with senior executives of CSR units at several SP500
rms and data obtained from 2013 sustainability reports available on company web-
sites, we identied two primary dimensions that di¤erentiate CSR units. One di-
mension is the degree of integration of a rms CSR unit across the rest of the
organization. One measure of the degree of integration is to what extent the rm
has a particular business group specialize in CSR strategy activities. Another marker
of the degree of integration is how many levels of the organizational hierarchy de-
cide on CSR strategies. Some rms concentrate almost all decisions in the C-suite,
whereas others tend to push decisions all the way down to front-line employees. In an
intermediate form of CSR integration, each separate business unit acts as a separate
division in terms of deciding on CSR strategy; however, these decisions primarily take
place at the head of the respective business unit. The degree of integration of CSR
activities can then be conceptualized as the procedure of the rms CSR activities.
On one end of the spectrum of integration, a company like Intel embeds its CSR
activities within and across all of its business units. It also incentivizes all of its work-
ers to engage in sustainability: "Intel links a portion of every employees variable
compensation from front-line sta¤ to our CEO to environmental sustainability
metrics." On the other end of the integration spectrum is a company like Starbucks.
In 1999, Starbucks formed a stand-alone CSR department. This department is led
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by a Senior Vice President who focuses on business practices, environmental issues,
community a¤airs, corporate giving, and the Starbucks Foundation. The CSR unit
operates similarly to any other important business unit of the rm. Thus, whereas
Intel has to a large degree integrated its CSR strategy making throughout its orga-
nization, Starbucks has a separate division that specializes in CSR strategy making.
A second dimension di¤erentiating CSR units is the degree of prot alignment in
their CSR activities. Some types of CSR, such as some energy costs savings measures,
simply pay for themselves nancially. Another example is consumer-facing rms that
engage in CSR and in response enjoy an increase in customer sales that exceed such
CSR costs. These types of CSR would be appropriate in a Milton Friedman world
of CSR, where a managers sole responsibility is to maximize the prots of the rm
(Friedman (1970)). However, other types of CSR are not expected to generate a full
nancial return of its cost. One feature of this latter type of CSR is that it is often is
not well related to the market strategy activities of the rm. Another feature is that
the CSR may be done in such a way that it is di¢ cult to recoup many of the costs.
Thus, this second dimension can be conceptualized as the purpose of the rms CSR
activities.
On one extreme towards CSR prot alignment, there is Halliburton, which al-
though it appears in the 2013 Dow Jones Sustainability Index, lists "nancial Per-
formance" as the primary reason for its CSR e¤orts. In its sustainability report,
Halliburton further explains that its CSR issues impact "shareholder value and are,
therefore, important" to the company. On the other end of the spectrum is Patago-
nia, which reorganized under a Benet Corporation charter to make legally explicit
its objective of social performance and that it is not maximizing shareholder value
based solely on nancial outcomes.
From these two dimensions, we can now map CSR organizational forms into four
types. We denote a rm that is prot centric in its CSR and has its CSR strategic
activities largely carried out by a specialized business unit as Strategic. These rms
are generally engaging in CSR primarily for prot and are implementing their CSR
activities by means of this stand-alone CSR business unit. At the other extreme of
both dimensions is the organizational form we call Mission. Firms in this category
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are engaging in CSR from less of a prot motive. An additional sign of this type of
organizational form is that the CSR activities are devised and engaged in at possibly
all levels of the rm. Most benet corporations would also t in this category.
In contrast, those rms that disperse their CSR strategic activities broadly through-
out the organization but are more prot driven in their CSR pursuits are categorized
as Integrated. Finally, the opposite CSR organizational form of Integrated is Foun-
dation. These rms carry out CSR activities in a more stand-alone-unit fashion and
are not purely prot driven in their CSR.
In Figure 1, we plot four rms according to this CSR organization typology:
Figure 1: Organizational Form Typology
Of course, in practice, there are degrees of integration and degrees of prot
centered-ness. Thus, if we plotted a variety of rms, they would portray a dis-
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tribution of outcomes. In this spirit, we randomly selected a sample of 24 companies
from the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. We then hand collected data from each
rms most recent sustainability report and graded them on each dimension of our
typology.1 In addition to these DJSI companies, we added Patagonia as an example
of a benet corporation, and a far north-east reference point, creating a total sam-
ple of 25 rms. In Figure 2, we report the results of this qualitative analysis. We
then divide the resultant space into quadrants to map these rms into our typology
introduced with Figure 1.
Figure 2: Sample of Organizational Forms
It should also be noted that this chart represents rmsstated organizational form.
We are unable to test the actual organizational form of all of these rms. However,
there is some comfort in knowing that for those rms for which we interviewed top
1See the Appendix for information on our method of categorization.
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executives, we found similar proclamations from the executives as those in their
sustainability reports.
Although an exact plotting is admittedly subjective, it is apparent from this chart
that there is heterogeneity across rms. We next turn to identifying the environments
in which a rm should operate by means of a given organizational form to illuminate
the origins of this heterogeneity.
Model
To model the problem of organizational design, we assume that the rm chooses in-
tegration or specialization for two units, or groups.2 Integration means that both
units will perform both market and non-market activities. Specialization means that
one unit handles only market activities and the other handles non-market activities.
To match the reality that much of the non-market activity at rms that have a non-
market-specic unit involves corporate social responsibility activities, and to simplify
exposition, we refer to non-market activities in the model as CSR. For simplicity and
to abstract away from a team problem, we refer to each unit interchangeably as a
"manager." In particular, we consider two risk-neutral managers, 1 and 2; each man-
aging its respective unit.
The rm uses business units 1 and 2 to collectively implement a level of CSR
activity indexed by level S and a level of market activity indexed by levelM:3 Hence,
we explicitly consider both market and non-market choices without taking the other
2Note that Figure 2 provides a qualitative example of rms with varying degrees of integration
and prot-centeredness. To simplify the analysis and make sharp predictions, our theoretical analy-
sis focuses on the decision to choose integrated or specialized organizational forms for a given pair
of units. That is, we are exploring the world of Figure 1. See section () for a discussion of how to
link the resultant theory to the sample of rms in Figure 2.
3Of course, rather than a scalar choice, strategy activities are often multi-dimensional and can
be represented as a vector of choices. However, we could project a scalar output variable onto
multiple dimensions to capture complex activities. Thus, M and S can be thought of as the output
for a given multiple-dimension choice, which in sum represents a strategy. We can then order these
complex tasks by their output levels, creating a one-to-one mapping between complex activities
and scalar outputs. Since we do not introduce noise into our model, the scalar output choice then
becomes the scalar input choice.
10
as given, as is often the case in the extant literature (see Baron (2015)).
Total output Y is a function of both of these factors and is written as
Y M+ S; (1)
whereM =M1+M2, S = S1+S2; and  2 R+ captures CSR outputs contribution
to overall output.4 Thus,  measures how important CSR is in the rms production
process. For example, a rm that faces consumers who place a greater value on CSR,
enjoys a greater : In contrast, when  = 0; CSR activities do not help the production
process at all. We de not consider  < 0: This would mean that a rm is engaging
in CSR that hurts overall rm performance. A rm should not engage in this type
of CSR. Note that overall rm performance can also mean social performance in
addition to nancial performance (see section ()).
It is costly to implement activities, and this cost is a function of the level of
activity. In particular, a managers cost of production is
Ci  M
2
i
2
+
S2i
2
+ MiSi; (2)
for manager i 2 f1; 2g: The parameter  2 R captures the degree of economy of scope
of a mangers production process. In particular, when 0 <  < 1; as commonly
assumed (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)), increasing one level of production
increases the marginal cost of an additional unit of production on both dimensions.
This case can be thought of as a negative e¤ort spillover from one task to another;
as one becomes exhausted from one activity, increasing activity on either dimension
is more costly. If instead,  < 0; increasing production on one dimension, reduces
the cost of increased production on the other dimension. For example, if engaging
in more CSR enabled a manager to produce market activities more cheaply, then
 < 0: This could also be thought of as a learning spillover e¤ect: as one becomes
better at CSR, one can more e¤ectively generate market output (and or vice versa).
4We could add noise to the production process but since business units are risk neutral, it would
not change the results and would just add additional notation. If we instead assume the business
units are risk-averse, similar results to those presented obtain. However, notation and exposition
are greatly complicated.
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Finally, if  = 0; then there is no di¤erence between having one worker do two tasks
or two workers each do one task. In other words, any link between tasks is assumed
away.
Manager is payo¤s are
iY + Si; (3)
where i is the managers nancial payment,
5 which is calculated as share of total
output, and  2 R+ is a managers valuation of personally producing CSR. With this
latter term, we allow for a manager to be intrinsically motivated to produce some
level of CSR. We will assume that i  : This means that managers receive no less
nancial benet from market activities than utility from social activities. Recall that
our analysis is focusing on prot seeking rms and their workers. However, we will
later consider rms that care about CSR beyond its contribution to total output in
section (), as well as managers with high values of  > i in section (). With these
basic ingredients we can identify the managers activity-level choices as a function of
organizational form.
Integration
Assuming the managers are engaged in both market and CSR activities in their
respective units, we obtain the following production levels:
Lemma 1 If manager i engages in both market and CSR activities, outputs are
Mi =
i (+i)
1 2 and Si =
+( )i
1 2 for i 2 f1; 2g:6
Proof: See Appendix.
5We consider the optimal organizational form holding compensation structure xed. This allows
us to isolate organizational form e¤ects from di¤erential compensation e¤ects. We leave exploring
optimal pay structures to future work.
6Note that without additional assumptions, it is possible forMi and Si to take on negative values
for a given set of parameters. However, given such parameters, it simply means that Specialized,
the alternative organizational form, is the preferred one; this form always generates positive output,
as shown in the next section.
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We then calculate the total market output as
M =M1 +M2
=
(1 + 2)   (2 +  (1 + 2))
1  2 (4)
and social output as
S = S1 + S2
2 + (  ) (1 + 2)
1  2 : (5)
Thus, total output is
Yintegrated =
(1 + 2) + 2    (2 +  (1 + 2)) +  (  ) (1 + 2)
1  2 : (6)
Specialization
When managers only engage in one activity, we get the following outputs, assuming
manager 1 does M and manager 2 does S:
Lemma 2 If manager 1 engages in market activity and manager 2 engages in CSR
activity, outputs are M1 = 1 and S2 = 2 + :
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus, the rms total output is simply
Yspecialized = 1 +  (2 + ) : (7)
The next natural question is, when does a rm prefer specialization to integra-
tion? Fortunately, the analysis is simplied in that we do not need to worry about
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comparing protability or net output of di¤erent organizational forms but instead
we can simply compare which form provides the greatest output, as given by our
next Lemma.
Lemma 3 If Yintegrated> (<)Yspecialized, integration (specialization) is the optimal or-
ganizational form.
Proof: See Appendix.
We now use this Lemma to identify when one organizational form is preferred to
another.
Optimal Organizational Form
The optimal organizational form then depends on the primitives of the model. We
will consider each primitive in turn in order to identify when rms should choose one
organizational form over another.
Economy of Scope 
First consider the case as economy of scope approaches zero (i.e.,  ! 0): Then, we
have
2 +
 
1 + 2

(1 + 2) > 1 +  (2 + ) : (8)
This means that integrated generates greater total output than specialized. Intu-
itively, when there is su¢ cient economies of scope across both activities, having both
units engage in both strategies dominates being specialized, since two rather than
one units generate similar levels of output on both dimensions. Similarly, and more
extreme, is when  2 ( 1; 0): Here, Yintegrated is further increased compared to when
 = 0; while Yspecialized does not change, thus we still have Yintegrated > Yspecialized:
That is, if a manager becomes more e¤ective in engaging in one activity because
of engaging in the other, then market and CSR activities should naturally be inte-
grated within the organization. In contrast, as  ! +1; it can be shown that the
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inequality becomes the opposite: specialized is the preferred organizational form. In-
tuitively, when it becomes costly enough to engage in both activities simultaneously,
the rm is better o¤ having specialized units; one business unit should specialize in
CSR activities and the other in market activities. We label this increased cost as the
multi-tasking cost. To explore the e¤ects of the other model parameters, we now con-
sider, as commonly assumed (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)), more moderate
economy of scopes, such that 0 <  < 1:
Importance of CSR for Output 
Recall that  measures how much CSR activities contribute to overall output. First
consider the case when CSR is not very important in the production process (i.e., as
! 0): Then, we have Yintegrated = (1+2) 21 2 and Yspecialized = 1: Since i   and
 < 1; we have Yintegrated > Yspecialized; and the rm will choose to have integrated
units.7 When CSR matters little in total output, the manager is also receiving very
little incentive to participate in CSR since she is paid a share of output; thus, she will
choose relatively little CSR investment. This also means there will be little multi-
tasking cost to o¤set the advantage of having both units engage in both activities,
yielding greater output from units being integrated. In short, when CSR does not
matter, it makes little sense to have a separate unit engaging in CSR activities.
If instead CSR activities are very important in producing output (i.e., as  !
+1); it is also the case that Yintegrated > Yspecialized:Here, the synergy of CSR activities
and market activities in generating output overcomes any multi-tasking cost of having
managers engage in both activities. In practice, this means that when non-market
activities are important for market performance, it is critical to have the market and
non-market strategies integrated locally, which is best achieved by forcing business
units to engage in both types of activities.
However, for intermediate values of  and 8 it can be shown that the opposite
7The inequality Yintegrated > Yspecialized is true if and only if
 
2 + 1
2

> 2: To see this is
the case, note that
 
2 + 1
2
  min  1 + 2    1 + 2 > 2, where min is the minimum
of 1 and 2: The nal inequality follows since
 
1 + 2

> 2 for all  6= 1:
8From the previous section, regardless of ; we know that low and high values of  result
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is true: Yintegrated < Yspecialized. Intuitively, there are two forces that determine the
overall output of a rm with an integrated organizational form: the importance of
CSR to overall output  and the cost of multi-tasking :When the multi-tasking cost
 of a manager engaging in both CSR and market activities is su¢ ciently greater
relative to the benet  it provides to overall output, increased importance of CSR
(i.e., increased ) still induces the integrated rm to produce more CSR. However,
this greater CSR production is done with relatively poor e¢ ciency due to a higher ,
which yields a reduction in overall output for such a rm. Eventually, however, CSR
is valuable enough to production that it adequately o¤sets the multi-tasking cost ;
which yields an increase in overall output as the increased importance of CSR (i.e.,
increased ) induces greater rm production of it.9
Meanwhile, a specialized organizational form does not face such a tradeo¤, as
each unit only engages in only one activity, thus avoiding a multi-tasking cost .
Hence, Yspecialized is always increasing in : Consequently, the relative advantage
(or disadvantage) of the integrated organizational form compared to the specialized
organizational form is then U-shaped in the importance of CSR the rms production
process.
For an example of this U-shape of relative organizational-form advantage over
values  2 [0; 1], assume the following parameters: 1 = :25; 2 = :25;  = :2; and  =
:75. This yields Figure 3, showing that intermediate values of  predict specialization
in optimal organizational forms of integration and specialization, respectively. Hence, we must
consider intermediate values of  to explore the e¤ects of :
9Formally, this can be seen by noting that Yintegrated is rst decreasing and then increasing in
: In particular, we see that @@Yintegrated =
2
1 2 ( + (  ) (1 + 2)) :
Thus, @@Yintegrated > 0 if and only if  + (  ) (1 + 2) > 0: If we x  su¢ ciently greater
than 0 (note that 12 (1 + 2) > , since i  ); then low values of  generate @@Yintegrated < 0
and higher values of  generate @@Yintegrated > 0: In other words, Yintegrated is U-shaped in :
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(i.e., the gray region), whereas low and high values of  predict integration:
Figure 3: Integration and the Importance of CSR
The x-axis of the graph represents  2 [0; 1]: Given a level of ; the blue,
dashed line is the output from the organizational form of integrated, whereas the
red, solid line is the output from the organizational form of specialized. Whichever
organizational-form output is higher identies the preferred organizational form.
Thus, for the gray region, which is approximately  2 (:25; :85); specialized is pre-
ferred. Otherwise, integrated provides superior total output.
Manager Valuation of CSR 
Now consider increasing . We nd that as  !1; Yintegrated > Yspecialized if and only
if  > 2
1+2
: Thus, if CSR is su¢ ciently important in the production process, then
given the manager cares enough about CSR, integration is preferred. In this case, the
rm and managers are aligned in producing higher levels of both market and CSR
activities. Otherwise, if CSR is not as important, and given the manager cares enough
about CSR, specialization is preferred. Intuitively, if a manager cares a lot about
CSR, but CSR is not that important for production, the rm is better o¤ having
17
that manager produce CSR alone rather than having both managers simultaneously
engaging in CSR.
Firm Valuation of CSR
Now we consider the case where the rm values CSR beyond its contribution to
output. In particular, assume that the rms objective is to maximize
Y M+ S+ S;
where  is the rms additional valuation of social output over its value to nancial
output. However, note that we can rewrite this as
Y M+ eS;
where e =  + : Hence, our previous analysis of  applies here as well. That
is, we witness a U-shaped relationship between the relative advantage of integrated
compared with specialized as a function of the rms valuation of CSR.
Non-CSR non-market functions
Those rms with substantial non-market activities divorced from CSR strategy can
also be nested within our model and typology. These non-CSR non-market activities
generally include actions such as inuencing legislation, inuencing regulations, and
litigation actions (see Baron (2009)). If we assume a manager does not value their
personal engagement in these activities outside of its value in increasing nancial
performance, we simply set manager non-market production valuation  = 0: Now
consider what happens when  = 0; this yields
Yintegrated =
(1 + 2)   ( (1 + 2)) +  (  ) (1 + 2)
1  2
and
Yspecialized = 1 + 
22:
18
As can be shown, the inequality Yintegrated > Yspecialized always holds with  = 0:
In this world, under an integrated form, the manager provides the exact division of
labor between market and CSR activities as preferred by the rm. Since the rm is
receiving market activity level e¤ort from two managers rather than only one (i.e.,
when specialized), this double activity more than o¤sets the cost of multi-tasking.
Here we are again assuming moderate multi-tasking costs of 0 <  < 1: Of course, as
shown in section () ; if  is too great, the specialized organizational form will again
dominate, even with  = 0.
In practice, non-market strategy often entails both CSR and non-CSR non-market
activities. Hence, for our model, we could redene manager is payo¤ as
iY + eSi;
where e = ; with 0 <  < 1: The term  then captures the fraction of non-
market activities that are represented by CSR activities, for which manager i values
her personal production at rate : With this new notation, we can reassess all of
our previous analysis in terms of e; manager is e¤ective valuation of personal non-
market activity production. For a given level of non-market activity, those rms
with a relatively high share of CSR activities (i.e., high ) and managers with high
valuation of CSR activities (i.e., high ) are likely to be integrated, assuming su¢ cient
returns to non-market strategy given the rms economy of scope (i.e.,  > 2
1+2
); as
given by our previous analysis in section () :
Relating Theory to Organizational Form in Practice
In practice, as shown in Figure 2, many (large) rms have some degree of integrated
organizational form rather than being fully integrated or fully specialized. We can
conceive of rms that are partially integrated and partially specialized as follows:
consider a rm that has a combination of integrated and specialized units. For
example assume a rm has 10 units. Di¤erent parts of the rm could have di¤erent
features (e.g., di¤erent values of  and ) that dictate some units to be specialized
and some to be integrated. Perhaps, the marketing unit is fully integrated and the
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nance and operation units are specialized. On average, we would expect those rms
that have a greater total degree of rm-wide ; to also have a greater degree of rm-
wide integration (i.e., have more integrated units), for example. Hence, with this
conceptualization, we can still make predictions about the degree of integration as a
function of rm-wide parameters.
From section () ; we showed that the incidence of integrated organizational form is
U-shaped in the degree that a rm cares about CSR beyond any nancial benet that
it might yield. This suggests that the degree of integration should also be U-shaped
in the degree a rm cares about CSR beyond prots.
We can then relate the pattern of the data from section () to our theoretical
analysis. To do so, we t a quadratic model to the 25 observations: In particular,
we regress the degree of integration (i.e., integer values 1 through 10) on a quadratic
equation of the degree of being less prot centric with CSR (i.e., integer values 1
through 10). In Figure 4, we show the resulting estimated polynomial:
Figure 4: Quadratic t to Sample
With so few observations and the fact that the data was qualitatively obtained,
we must view this chart with care and merely consider it suggestive, albeit consistent
with our theory. In the end, the hope is that this papers theoretical predictions will
spur future rigorous, quantitative exploration into the organization of non-market
strategy.
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Once a rms degree of integrated form is determined, its second dimension,
the importance of CSR beyond prots, identies its placement in one of our four
quadrants of our typology: From the analysis in the previous section, we expect the
rms where CSR has the greatest and least value to be integrated and thus to be
Mission and Integrated rms, respectively. In contrast, the rms that are slightly
more moderate in their valuation of CSR are predicted to fall either into the Strategy
or Foundation category, depending on how important CSR is to them. Of course,
if a rm faces extremely great (or poor) economies of scope (i.e., low (high) multi-
tasking costs), it will necessarily be integrated (or specialized). For these cases, it is
also the rms value of CSR that determines its ultimate location in our typology.
Hence, assuming a reasonable proportion of rms with moderate economies of scope,
we expect in practice the location of rms in our typology to trace through the four
quadrants in a U-shaped manner, as found in the suggestive chart above. The greater
the proportion of rms with moderate economies of scope, the greater the strength
of the U-shape.
Conclusion
We created a typology for non-market organizational design. In particular, we identi-
ed two dimensions of categorization: the degree that CSR activity is integrated with
market activities within a rm and the importance of CSR strategy in a rms pro-
duction process. We dubbed these resulting four organizational types as Integrated,
Strategic, Mission, and Foundation.
We then used a simple model to identify when rms are likely to choose each
of these organizational forms. Our primary nding is that the relative advantage
of rms with integrated over specialized organizational forms is U-shaped in the
importance of CSR: those rms for which CSR has either a high or low level of
importance whether its because of the importance of CSR strategy on market out-
comes, a rms value of CSR beyond its nancial value, or a managers high valuation
of CSR are most likely to choose an integrated organizational form, combining mar-
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ket and CSR activities throughout the rm. In contrast, those rms where CSR is
moderately important in the production process are more likely to choose to special-
ize their CSR operations in a stand-alone business unit.
Empirical implications of these results are severalfold. First, once proxies for the
importance of CSR to the rm are identied (i.e., measures of managerial valuation
of CSR, measures of the degree of CSR complementaries with nancial performance,
and the preferences of the board of directors and shareholders concerning CSR),
the U-shaped relationship between these and the probability of CSR integration
can be assessed. Second, using a proxy for the proportion of non-CSR non-market
activities (e.g., political contributions and lobbying) can be used to test an increase of
such a proxy being associated with reduced incidence of CSR specialization. Third,
measures of the economy of scope of a rm should also predict organizational form.
At the extreme, strong (poor) economies of scope predict integration (specialization).
We note that our analysis did not formally explore more than two divisions. Al-
though we trust the intuition will carry over to n divisions, we leave this analysis
to future research. Similarly, we did not simultaneously explore the joint e¤ects
of myriad forces, as is typical of the agent-based simulation literature. This paper
suggests future avenues of research by means of this methodology: numerical simula-
tions could determine organizational outcomes based on the assumption that certain
strategic activities are correlated in terms of payo¤s. This would be a departure from
the standard approach of assuming iid draws of payo¤ proles. However, it could
provide rich insights into the integration of market and non-market strategy and its
implications on the organization of non-market strategy.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1 If manager i engages in both market and CSR activities, outputs are
Mi =
i (+i)
1 2 and Si =
+( )i
1 2 for i 2 f1; 2g:
The managers problem is
max
Mi;Si

iY + Si  

M2i
2
+
S2i
2
+ MiSi

:
Obtaining the rst order conditions yields the following:
FOCMi : i  Mi   Si = 0
=)Mi = i   Si
FOCSi : i +    Si   Mi = 0
=) Si = i +    Mi:
Using the system of four resultant equations yields
M1 =
1    ( + 1)
1  2
S1 =
 + (  ) 1
1  2
M2 =
2    ( + 2)
1  2
S2 =
 + (  ) 2
1  2 :
QED.
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Lemma 2 If manager 1 engages in market activity and manager 2 engages in
CSR activity, outputs are M1 = 1 and S2 = 2 + :
Assume manager 1 does M and manager 2 does S:
Manager 10s problem is
max
M1

1Y  
M21
2

;
which yields optimal choice of level
M1 = 1:
Manager 20s problem is
max
S2

2Y + S2  
S22
2

:
and the managers CSR choice becomes
S2 = 2 + :
QED.
Lemma 3 If Yintegrated> (<)Yspecialized, integration (specialization) is the optimal
organizational form.
By optimal organizational form we mean the greatest output net of the costs
of creating such output (i.e., greatest "net output"). For the purely prot driven
rm (i.e., the rm that does not care about CSR output beyond its contribution to
nancial performance), net output is simply nancial prot. The net output derived
from either non-market organizational form (i.e., integrated or specialized) is simply
the share of output after paying managers for their e¤orts. Thus, we write the rms
net output  as a function of each organizational form as:
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integrated = (1  1   2)

(1 + 2) + 2    (2 +  (1 + 2)) +  (  ) (1 + 2)
1  2

specialized = (1  1   2) [1 +  (2 + )] :
We then see that integrated > specialized if and only if Yintegrated > Yspecialized :
integrated > specialized
() (1  1   2)

(1 + 2) + 2    (2 +  (1 + 2)) +  (  ) (1 + 2)
1  2

> (1  1   2) [1 +  (2 + )]
() (1 + 2) + 2    (2 +  (1 + 2)) +  (  ) (1 + 2)
1  2
> 1 +  (2 + )
() Yintegrated > Yspecialized;
QED.
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Appendix B: Organizational Form Typology Coding
To categorize our sample of 25 rms, we rst studied if the rms procedure for
engaging in CSR was more driven by an integrated or specialized organizational form
approach. Specically, using each rms 2013 Sustainability report, we analyzed how
CSR-related decisions were made and implemented. Many reports also provided
schematics on the ow of decision making and implementation of CSR strategy. We
further explored if strategy was generated from within a central CSR unit versus cre-
ated autonomously within separate business units, and if generated from a specialized
unit, how much inuence outside units had on the specialized units activities. Based
on this qualitative review, we rated rms by assigning them an integer between 1
and 10, inclusive, where 10 was having CSR fully integrated throughout the rm
and 1 was fully specialized. Ranks were then compared to assess relative di¤erences
across rms and verify the appropriate rating of each of the 25 rms. To do so, two
research assistants (RAs) independently created a rating for each rm, as well as a
summary of their qualitative research to justify each of their ratings. We then all
met to discuss the ratings and rationales to arrive at a nal rating for each rm.
To score rms on the dimension of how prot centered their CSR activities were,
we followed the same process by having each RA score rms and provide rationale, as
well as engage in a discussion. However, for this dimension we explored the purpose
of the rms CSR activities. If a CEO stated that CSR was used because it increases
shareholder value or makes economic sense, for example, this generated a more prot
centric rating (i.e., a lower number) than if the CEO instead said CSR is engaged
in because it helps make the world a better place. Overall, this purpose rating was
formed primarily by reviewing statements from top management that argued for why
their company engages in CSR activities. The more statements that linked prot
and CSR, the more prot centric their rating, and the more statements that linked
CSR and non-(direct)prot motives, the less prot centric their rating. Here, we
gave the most prot centric a rating of 1 and the least prot centric a rating of 10.
Other rms were assigned an integer in between these extremes.
In the end, the purpose of the qualitative coding exercise was to develop a sense
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of the types of organizational approaches rms are currently taking when engaging
in CSR by providing a simple, simultaneous snapshot of their e¤orts. From this
analysis, it became clear that there is signicant heterogeneity on both dimensions
of CSR purpose and procedure. This nding motivated our theoretical analysis to
help understand the origins of these di¤erences.
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